

Repartees: Silencing Replies from a Holistic Pragmatic Perspective

Ramia Fua'd Abdulazeez *

Department of English, College of Education for Women, University of Baghdad, Iraq

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Abstract

This study examines the holistic (i.e. causal) pragmatic structure of repartees, which are considered as silencing replies. It aims to build their structure by adopting Kopytko's (2009) approach. It also aims to identify the type of analogy which fuels such witty replies via adopting Itkonen's (2005) relation-based taxonomy. The methodology followed is qualitative represented by analyzing examples, from various sources, via an eclectic approach built on the two approaches mentioned above. The study endeavors to answer one question: What is the basic component which makes such replies silence their interlocutors? The answer has been shown to be self-referential analogy whose embodiment is binary- temporal and personal. It is concluded that a repartee's holistic pragmatic structure embraces static and dynamic components. The former includes two: locution and perlocution. The latter, in turn, pertains to the illocution whose force changes in accordance with the context in its broadest sense. The significance of this study lies in its being the first linguistic one to bridge the gap in the literature on the concept of repartees as tackled here. It can help individuals to issue witty replies to silence their opponents when having unallowed standpoints, especially those concerned with bullying or hate speech in general.

Keywords: Analogy, Construction, Holistic Pragmatics, Repartee, Silencing.

1. Introduction

When people communicate with each other, they have various outcomes swinging between achieving and not achieving their communicative goals, roughly speaking. One of the probable types of communicative goals is to silence our interlocutors. This is achieved by issuing repartees which refer to witty replies that turn the table against our interlocutor's first argument within a specific context, thus silence our arguers. Accordingly, silence in those situations is not to be considered as much more eloquent than words as what several studies had proved (for example, Kurzon (1995), Duranti (2009), Al-

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* Corresponding Author: ramiafa@csu.uobaghdad.edu.iq

Harahsheh (2012), Ejam and Dhayef (2021), Taiai (2022), Ali and Yaseen (2023), Goha et al. (2023), and Pinillos (2023). In all of these, it is the interlocutor's choice to keep silent in one way or another. And this is exactly what this work departs from. That is, silence is presented, herein, as an unintended perlocutionary act obtained not due to the pieces of information conveyed between speaker (S) and hearer (H), but due to the 'unexpectedness' element borne by a specific technique - analogy. Nevertheless, it is not any type of analogy which ignites a repartee (silencing reply), it should be an instant analogy appealing to the other interlocutor (addressee) per se at two levels: temporal and personal. The former refers to the mean (near) time when the speech event occurs; the latter, in turn, pertains to a personal issue of that very addressee on the basis of which an analogy is made. Accordingly, this article starts with structuring repartees from a holistic (i.e. causal) pragmatic perspective, thus rapidly reviewing holistic pragmatics and its basic tenets. Then, it delves into analogy by defining and classifying it, in what serves the aims, and finally builds repartees as analogy-disguised acts from a causal pragmatic angle. To the best of my knowledge, no other study has shed light on repartees from a linguistic perspective, in general, and pragmatic, in particular. So, the present work sets itself this task.

2. Theoretical Framework and Related Studies

This section presents an illustrative account on holistic pragmatics and analogy. It aims to build the ground on which repartees are analyzed. Certain examples are given and analyzed accordingly to clarify the idea more.

2.1 Holistic (Causal) Pragmatics

According to Kopytko (2009, 248), holistic pragmatics involves causality covering causes and effects. Hence, human communication, viewed from this angle, is causal because it encompasses mental changes (for instance, (mis)understanding, awareness, confusion, etc.) and affects the behavior of interlocutors (responding, involving in or lacking interaction, etc.). Briefly worded, as Kopytko puts it, "each speech act or utterance is potentially causal, that is, it may produce some either intended or *unintended* mental, social, *interactional*, or bodily consequences" (248) (*italics mine*). The italicized words support the way by which this work depicts repartees (or silencing replies as both are used interchangeably): witty utterances whose salient consequence is unintentionally silencing the addressee, even for seconds, so the interaction cannot proceed any further as it started. The basic principles of holistic pragmatics have been best illustrated by Kopytko (2009, 251-2):

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A causal interaction consists of a series of causal processes (CP) analyzed by means of *constructions* and *reconstructions* of communicative goals. Thus first, senders construct their message – Cs (represents the sender's construct); then receivers reconstruct the message in virtue of their pragmabilities – Rr (represents the receiver's reconstructions), or they fail to reconstruct the message correctly. In the second phase of the process, the receivers construct a response – Cr (receiver's construct), and finally, the senders reconstruct the receivers' construct – Rs (sender's reconstruction). Consequently, the causal interaction (CI) can be symbolically represented as follows:

(A) CI – [CP1(Cs → Rr)1 (Cr → Rs)2], [CP2 ... CPn]

The process of construction and reconstruction in causal interaction can be represented in (B) and (C), respectively, as follows:

(B) Construction(sender)[Reason → Intention(Illocution) → Action(locution)]

(C) Reconstruction(receiver)[Cause(locution) → Outcome(perlocution) → Reaction]

One word in this quotation needs to be defined - pragmabilities. Kopytko (2009, 251) defines them as individually variant social skills and practices as well as interactional experiences in various communicative realms. Pragmabilities usually dwell on relating reason to result (or in his terms effectors to their targets) which wholly involves several cognitive systems (knowledge, reasoning, memory, attention, etc.), and it is precisely here shown why repartees are described as 'witty utterances'. Let's consider the following example, invoked from Grothe (2005, 123), to actualize a holistic pragmatic structure:

(1) A legendary example involves two familiar names, George Bernard Shaw and Winston Churchill. Shaw, best remembered today as a great playwright, was almost as well known in his time for his political beliefs (an avowed socialist, he was a founding member of the Fabian Society). In the early years of the twentieth century, Shaw was no fan of Churchill, at the time a rising star in England's Conservative Party. Shortly before the opening of his 1913 play *Pygmalion*, Shaw sent Churchill a telegram that read:

reserving two tickets for you for my premiere.

come and bring a friend—if you have one.

Churchill quickly responded with a telegram of his own to Shaw:

impossible to be present for first performance.

will attend the second—if there is one.

From a causal pragmatic point of view, this example can be analyzed as follows:

Shaw issued a construction (an illocution that Churchill does not have friends) by an utterance which was understood by Churchill, owing to his pragmabilities. The latter in his turn made a reconstruction in the same manner above, that is, he turned the table on Shaw, by making a repartee involving an analogy with some aspect of Shaw's - his works (a detailed account on analogy as tackled in this paper is given below). But how could we get the implied meaning once an utterance conveys one? Greenall (2009, 128-9) answers this question by presenting what he calls "the implicature package whose elements together cause the given experience, perception, response of/to the implicature". Thus, as a starting point, a repartee dwells on default reasoning in the sense realized by Bach (as cited in Jaszczolt 2009, 215) whereby the gist is "standardization facilitated by precedents of similar use of the particular expression. Standardization short-circuits the process of inference, and the hearer draws the inference without being conscious of the process". On this point, Marquer and Couceiro (2023, 2) argue that analogical inference may be considered as "transferring knowledge from a source domain to a different, but somewhat similar, target domain by leveraging simultaneously on similarities and dissimilarities". The only difference, yet, lies in the precedent which is not a similar expression - in the case of a silencing reply - as much as it is a similar situation, to a greater or lesser degree, which fires an instant analogy. Viewed as such, silencing is never meant to be dealt with in the same way conducted by Dimitrov (2019) and Wu (2021) who presented it as a 'strategic' move. Silencing is never strategic in this work; it is approached from a completely different perspective: an instant unplanned move driven by an interlocutor's 'unallowed standpoint', to use the exact words of Wu (2019, 489). It follows that silencing, in this work, embraces two features:

- a. Analogy with self-referentiality to that very interactant; and
- b. Unwilling agreement by the other interactant.

Each of these will be detailed soon. The concept of self-referentiality was first presented by Searle in 1983. Oishi (2009, 331-2), in his part, shows the difference between various opinions concerning this concept, where the most relevant to the present aims is the one comparing between Searle's 1983 and Recanati's 2007. For the former, self-referentiality is a matter of satisfactory conditions of perception and action; the latter, however, depicts it as a force. What is going to be synthesized, in this work, and dressed to self-referentiality is a mixture of perception and action supported by force. That is to say, once an unallowed standpoint is perceived, the action (i.e. speech act) issued is a repartee (i.e. silencing reply) hinging upon an other's (i.e. addressee's) self-referentiality instantiating a force of analogy. Let's consider another example, taken from Grothe (2005, 1) to demonstrate how self-referentiality is employed in repartees:

(2) Nancy Astor, an American socialite who married into an English branch of the wealthy Astor family (she holds the distinction of being the first woman elected to Parliament). At a 1912 dinner party in Blenheim Palace—the Churchill family estate—Lady Astor became annoyed at an inebriated Churchill, who was pontificating on some topic. Unable to take any more, she finally blurted out, “Winston, if you were my husband, I’d put poison in your coffee.” Without missing a beat, Churchill replied:

Nancy, if you were my wife, I’d drink it.

The unallowed standpoint here is that one should dislike, not to say hate, someone else when they would like to poison them. Thus, Nancy indirectly expresses that to Churchill who perceived it correctly and replied by issuing a self-reference speech act to her ‘If you were ..., I’d ...’. The analogy here is made as a retort to the initial one already issued by Nancy. Yet, even if the unallowed standpoint does not involve analogy explicitly, then the repartee will embrace one:

(3) Male Boor: I can’t abide fools.

Dorothy Parker: Apparently your mother can.

In this example from (The Hypertexts), the analogy is not directly made to Boor himself, but rather to one of his ‘aspects’ - his mother.

As for the second feature of a repartee, i.e. unwilling agreement, it can be illustrated at two levels: agreement and unwillingness. The former is elaborated on by the fact that once communication (of whatever form) takes place between interlocutors, each of them expects and agrees to receive responses from others, the matter which varies in accordance with the initiating standpoint (whether allowed or not). That agreement, then, is described as unwilling because whatever standpoint made back, to the initiating one, should be accepted, even if unallowed, otherwise there will either be a communication breakdown, e.g. a quarrel, a physical disengagement, e.g. leaving interlocutors alone altogether, or getting into another argument different from the initiating one. It is necessary to indicate, at this point, that an unallowed standpoint can be presented in many forms: interrogative, imperative, declarative, or even exclamative. The following is a folk Arabic example on an interrogative unallowed standpoint is:

(4) Two men, S and H, are sitting on both sides of a table, S asks H:

S: What is the difference between you and a donkey?

H: Just this table!

One question needs to be raised now: What specifically identifies the (un)allowedness of a standpoint? It is common that a standpoint is deemed unallowed once it appeals to a personal issue of our interlocutor especially those which attempt to belittle them directly or indirectly. The following example, taken from an interview with a famous Arabic artist, where the presenter (P) asks the artist (A) about the

reason behind her choosing a red dress in the photo session for her new movie in the cinema. Paradoxically, P herself was wearing a red dress in the interview. The exchange was as follows:

(5) P: It is said that you selected that red-colored dress for the photo session because you liked to appear sexier than you have ever used to be, is that correct?

A: You are wearing a red dress today because you'd like to look sexier or because you like it?

P: keeps silent

Here, P's initiating standpoint is considered unallowed as it attempts, intentionally or not, to belittle A: when someone is told to look sexy in a decontextualized manner, then the expression made is regarded unallowed. In other words, it is decontextualization in its broadest sense, i.e. Firthian, which is taken to be the ground on which 'unallowedness' stands. Such decontextualization falls into various types, e.g. situational, as in the example just cited. The following example gives another type:

(6) Two divorced women (W1 and W2) are talking to each other:

W1: I have learnt much from you on how to pamper my husband. You are my model.

W2: What have you learnt from me? You just got divorced twice! What did you learn then?

W1: keeps silent.

Decontextualization pertains to logic here, that is, it relates to stating something which is logically unacceptable: How could a divorced woman learn to pamper her husband from another divorced one as both do not have husbands at all, or, more accurately, they could not continue living with their husbands!

Still another type - verbal - is found in this Arabic folk example:

(7) Man1: I saw you distantly and thought you are a woman.

Man 2: And I saw you distantly and thought you are a man.

Regarded as silencing, a repartee can be subsumed under Kurzon's (1995, 62) diagram of silence analyzed from the ability perspective. Nevertheless, his conception does not apply to the type of silence introduced herein. Thus, a slight adaptation, highlighted in bold, can be made to widen his horizon:




Figure 1: Adapting Kurzon's (1995) model of silence

It is necessary to pinpoint that the 'having nothing more to say' as added above differs a lot from the 'ignorance' element already part of the diagram. This is because in the first the unexpectedness conveyed by self-referentiality, especially relating in one way or another to the addressee per se, makes them speechless. In the second, however, the interlocutor does not have specific pieces of information on a certain topic.

Repartees, then, are stipulatively defined, from a causal pragmatic perspective, as *an instant reconstruction whose locution is composed of the addressee's self-referential analogy, its illocution has various forces: such as jocularly (example 1 and 6), defense (examples 2,3,5), insult (examples 4 and 7), whereas the perlocution, which is unintended, is wholly silencing*. The next section elaboratively discusses the various types of analogy employed in issuing a repartee.

2.2 Analogy: construction and taxonomy

Analogy is never hard to understand. It was studied for many years by many scholars and subsumed within various fields. Nevertheless, this paper presents it from a particular angle, holistic pragmatic, as far as its definition, or construction, and taxonomizing are concerned.

2.2.1 Construction

Analogy, as commonly known, hinges upon similarity between two (or more) matters of whatever type (objects, systems, etc.). It is a meta-relation (of similarity) holding between relations, as pointedly defined by Itkonen (2005, 1). In fact, it is considered as 'meta' because if all the examples cited above are re-examined, it becomes clear that issuing a repartee passes through two steps: (a) comparing between a construction and reconstruction; and then (b) comparing between what both 'ventriloquistically', as called by Nunberg (2008, 266), mean. Thus, analogy is further presented here as involving two salient features: context-dependence, and source-target division. The former is reported by Itkonen (2005, 13) and Crespo (2023, 19) who stress the role which context plays with analogies respectively: "analogy is relative to the context in which it is used or, equivalently, to the point of view from which it is considered or created", "analogy involves a general focal meaning as well as derivative meanings that adapt its general concept to specific contexts". It is this feature which justifies invoking examples from two cultures - English and Arabic. As for the source-and-target division, it is proposed by Alhambra (2023, 554) and Marquer and Couceiro (2023, 2). On a closer inspection, the source and target terms reflect the construction and reconstruction terms adopted here to analyze repartees. The only difference, however, is in intention: in analogy there should be an intention of some kind depending on the context. Repartees, as wholly built on analogy, employ analogy in a more subtle manner, as shown above.

2.2.2 Taxonomy

There have been several taxonomies of analogy as many as the fields within which it is subsumed (e.g. legal, logical, epistemic, etc.). However, the most relevant to the present aims is Itkonen's (2005), as detailed below:

2.2.2.1 Itkonen's (2005) relation-based taxonomy

Provided that analogy is considered as a meta-relation (as just cited above), then its taxonomy rests to a classification of such relations, a task which Itkonen (2005, 15-19) had successfully done. According to him, analogical relations are mainly bipartite: ontological (already exist or just begin to) and epistemic (already known or just begin to be). These both can either be symmetric or asymmetric. Hence, in hyperlinking them all, we have four possibilities:

Type 1: Ontologically and epistemically symmetric.

Type 2: Ontologically symmetric and epistemically asymmetric.

Type 3: Ontologically and epistemically asymmetric.

Type 4: Ontologically asymmetric and epistemically symmetric.

Type 1: Two analogous systems both exist and are known in the same way, as in the systems of birds and fish. So, the relation between the two animals was literally discovered.

Type 2: Two analogous systems exist in the same way, but one of them is known later than, and by virtue of, the other, as in the concepts of wave and sound. The concept of wave was first applied; that of sound was much better understood only when comparing between water waves and sound waves. Moreover, the existence of light waves was discovered even later. So, the relation between the two systems is discovered. However, discovery in this type hinges on the present time or even future, whereas in the former it is in the past.

Type 3: This is best exemplified and illustrated by the concept of invention or creation: something neither exists nor is it known to the public yet. So, the relation between the two systems is invented or created: something is made first, so it starts to exist, then with the passage of time - application, practice, use, etc. - it comes to be known.

Type 4: If we have two systems A and B, both are equally known, yet B starts to exist only after A. This is successfully exemplified by the notion of copy: when we copy something, all the replicates are just like the original though they existed after it. So, the relation between the two systems is imitation - B imitates A. Now, let's consider the following examples to check on the workability of such logical relations, all the following examples are cited from (The Hypertexts):

(8) Lady Astor: Winston, you're drunk!

Winston Churchill: But I shall be sober in the morning and you, madam, will still be ugly.

From a holistic pragmatic perspective, and in view of the analogical relations above, this repartee is to be analyzed as follows:

Construction (A) you're drunk (which is something bad).

Reconstruction (B) in my bad condition, I see you ugly, when I will be sober, you will still be ugly.

A & B = Type 3 (ontologically and epistemically asymmetric)

There is no logical relation between being drunk and being ugly. However, it can be created in some way: A implies some negative interpretations about someone being drunk. This negativity was paid back with an analogous 'aspect' of the addressee (Lady Astor), that is, being ugly. That is, being described as beautiful or ugly is crucial to women, unlike men whose sobriety is far more important to them. Thus, each made their move by appealing to the aspect which provokes the other much more. So, the relation between being drunk and being ugly is invented.

(9) Lewis Morris: There's a conspiracy against me, a conspiracy of silence. What should I do?

Oscar Wilde: Join it.

Construction (A) There is a conspiracy of silence against me.

Reconstruction (B) Join it.

A & B = Type 1 (ontologically and epistemically symmetric)

The logical relation between having a conspiracy is to be prepared to face it. If that conspiracy is of silence, it is logical to keep silent as well. This means that it is because that conspiracy is 'of silence', the relation is coined as belonging to Type 1.

(10) Female fan: Mr. Joyce, may I kiss the hand that wrote Ulysses?

James Joyce: No, it did a lot of other things, too.

A & B = Type 2 (ontologically symmetric and epistemically asymmetric)

It is well known that all of us have hands, yet the functions for which we use them come to be known later, just after refusing the request to kiss the hands which can do some other dispreferred things - cleaning dirt, for instance.

(11) Actress: I enjoyed reading your book. Who wrote it for you?

Ilka Chase: Darling, I'm so glad that you liked it! Who read it for you?

A & B = Type 4 (ontologically asymmetric and epistemically symmetric).

Reading and writing are both equally known, yet B here is an imitation of A in the structure and the implied meaning. That is to say, reading in B has come only after writing in A through imitation. The implied meaning in both is that Chase does not know how to write, and the actress does not know how to read. [For another perspective on the relations within analogy, see Benitez (2022)].

3. Methods and Procedures

Eleven situations were analyzed to investigate the holistic (that is, causal) pragmatic structure of repartees. The analysis was qualitative relying on a mixture of the two approaches of Kopytko's (2009) and Itkonen's (2005).

3.1 Data Collection

The data analyzed in this study were taken from three sources: Grothes' (2005), (The Hypertexts), some Arabic folk examples. This is done for assuring variability of the data to ensure the workability of the approach suggested, thus supporting the point of context as raised and discussed in the work.

3.2 Data Analysis

The data were analyzed by depending on the two approaches referred to above. To clearly highlight the way in which repartees have been analyzed, the diagram below shows the process of the analysis. That is, the method followed here is qualitative bottom up, i.e. it started with details one by one through analyzing many examples that instantiate the various components of the approaches adopted, to build the whole structure of repartees in the end, accordingly. This entails embedding the analysis of data within the literature review to actualize the idea more vividly.

3.2.1 Analyzing repartees

After weaving the texture of repartees neatly, the whole picture can be rapidly revisited in the following lines:

First, a repartee is considered as a reconstruction, from a holistic pragmatic perspective, which consists of three components: locution, illocution, and perlocution. Each of these is further sub-divided into other components. Locution is analyzed by means of self-referential analogy which is a context-sensitive meta-relation involving ontology and epistemology symmetry and/or asymmetry. Viewed as such, there are four possibilities of relations to instantiate analogy: Ontologically and epistemically symmetric, ontologically symmetric and epistemically asymmetric, ontologically and epistemically asymmetric, and ontologically asymmetric and epistemically symmetric. The second component, i.e. illocution, is further analyzed as being a force. That force could be one of many possibilities: Jocular, defense, insult, etc., depending on the context and the aim of the speaker. The last component in the diagram is perlocution, which is further analyzed as 'unintended silencing' one's opponent due to 'unexpectedness' and wit encoded in such replies. Fig. 2 below schematically manifests the holistic pragmatic structure of repartees as constructed in this paper:

Repartees: Silencing Replies from a Holistic Pragmatic Perspective




Figure 2: Repartees holistically pragmatically structured

4. Findings

Analyzing a repartee as a reconstruction which consists of three basic components: locution, illocution, and perlocution has given the following findings:

4.1 Locution, Illocution, Perlocution

Within illocution, the yardstick against which a repartee is measured is self-referential analogy at two dimensions: temporal and personal. As regards illocution, it is the most variant component in which it can instantiate many forces: some of which have been shown as: jocularity, argumentative, and insulting. Nevertheless, these are the forces which have been identified here, there could be many others depending

on the examples analyzed. As for the 'perlocution' component, the only token is unintendedly silencing the interlocutor. It is regarded 'unintended' because on issuing a repartee, an arguer's main intent is not silencing the other as much as it is to reply in what makes them appear unbeaten.

4.2 *Analogy with Self-referentiality*

All the four types of meta-relations, i.e. ontologically and epistemically symmetric, ontologically symmetric and epistemically asymmetric, ontologically and epistemically asymmetric, ontologically asymmetric and epistemically symmetric, do constitute part of repartees. However, they are activated within a certain context. This latter has been found to refer to context in its broadest sense, as presented by Firth 1957.

4.3 *Rhetoric*

Furthermore, it has been discovered that repartees do act as a rhetorical appeal. Built as analogy-disguised acts, repartees have been remarked to dwell heavily on a certain type of reasoning, referred to as default in 2.1 above. Worded differently, that certain type of reasoning springs from analogy per se which imposes deduction in one way or another. Yet, this deduction is not the same well-known concept whereby the validity of the conclusions follows that of the premises, wherein it is impossible for the premises to be true, and the conclusion false, as stated by Walton (2008, 138, 159):

(1) All birds (strictly speaking) fly.

Tweety is a bird.

Therefore, Tweety flies.

Deduction, in repartees, is not meant to focus on the validity of the premises as much as on the illocution communicated. In all the examples above, none of the constructions and reconstructions, holistic pragmatically speaking, reflects a valid premise to varying degrees, they just express their speakers' opinions. In example (4), for instance, S and H are never donkeys, but each has been described as such by analogic deduction. By analogic deduction is meant, here, the process of assembling and comprehending the relations between the compared objects to yield one conclusion which is itself the illocution reconstructed away from the validity issue. The following formula can be proposed to analogic deduction:

- *Since A, then B*

In terms of analogic deduction just defined and formulated, example (7) above, for instance, can be viewed as follows:

Since you described me as a woman, then you are not a man.

The issue of escaped validity is obvious in the two premises of Man 1 and Man 2, where both are men but expressed as not being so.

By so claiming, repartees would seem to instantiate rhetoric, but in what sense? In fact, the rhetoric which repartees realize is that proposed by Rapp (2002, 4) who views it as a fruitful means for those who would like to outwit their audience and conceal their real intentions for some reason. By so adopting, rhetoric here is not associated with persuasion, as usually collocated by many (e.g. Booth (2004), Kennedy (2007), and Walton (2007), to name just a few). It mainly appeals to beating one's interlocutor indirectly. It follows, then, that *logos*, i.e. appeal to reason, is the rhetorical appeal usually invoked when issuing a repartee.

5. Discussion

In all the examples analyzed, what activated a repartee is an unallowed construction, holistic pragmatically speaking. This means it (i.e. a repartee) is not an initiating act. Regarded as such, a repartee's locution should involve some personal aspect of the initiator, that is, the one who made the construction, to pay it back. This is why self-referential analogy is employed as a basic and static component of any repartee. Worded differently, self-referential analogy does not change whatever the context might be. An arguer cannot be stopped from talking about something in the realm of repartees, even unintendedly, unless some personal issue of their own is invoked. This is so because whatever might or could be said will refer to them (i.e. the ones who made the construction) in one way or another, and no one would like to appear or be considered as unreasonable in any argument.

What varies, nonetheless, is the illocution of that reconstruction in what accords with its context. The illocution varies along a mild-severe continuum: with jocularly at the mild extreme and insulting at the severe one. This is wholly dominated by the context of the whole situation. No criterion can be found, or even suggested, as to whether a certain repartee's force will be interpreted as mild or severe, it depends on the arguers in the first place, as well as other elements in the context of situation – time, place, participants, event, etc.

As regards perlocution, it has been presented as unintended because in all the examples cited, and even surveyed, no other turns have been documented after the repartee was issued. This is justified by two points:

- a. The unexpectedness generated with repartees as alluded to before; and
- b. Even if any kind of utterance was issued after a repartee, another self-referential analogy would be employed making the process endless. This is exactly what makes the self-referential analogy the basic component which fuels repartees. And it is here where the question of the study is answered.

6. Conclusion

A repartee is an umbrella term under which all witty responses are covered. It is an analogy-disguised act reflecting an individually variant skill whose mastery depends wholly on the pragma-ability of speakers no matter who they are. Its pragmatic structure embraces static and dynamic components. The former includes two: locution and perlocution. The latter, in turn, pertains to the illocution whose force changes in accordance with the context in its broadest sense. However, speakers can be trained somehow to issue a silencing reply by means of self-referential analogy whose embodiment is binary- temporal and personal. Though presented as a token of rhetoric, repartees show no concord with persuasion, they just attempt to express something completely different. Whatever the case might be, the salient feature of repartees is their shortness - their rhetoric resides more in their being short replies, so they hit the target through a shortcut way. Thus, they have not been described as pejoratively connoted terms, they can probably be employed to express some positive intention, and that is why an open node has been left in the force component. Accidentally, the examples cited in the paper all reflect some bad intentions of their holders, yet in the future other good intentions can be found since the base is still the same - self-referential analogy. Further research can make use of the holistic pragmatic approach to conduct studies on 'sensing' unallowed standpoints very early before they develop into one or more forms of hate speech, so that we can handle them as soon as possible.

الأجوبة البارة: أجوبة مسكتة من منظور تداولي شمولي

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جامعة بغداد / كلية التربية للبنات

الملخص

تتقصى الدراسة التركيب العملي الشمولي (السببي) للأجوبة البارة التي تعد أجوبة مسكتة في هذه الدراسة، إذ تهدف إلى بناء هيكلها بالاعتماد على مدخل Kopytko (2009) وتهدف أيضاً إلى تشخيص المجانسة التي تحرك هذه الردود بتطبيق تصنيف Itkonen (2005) القائم على أنواع العلاقات، أما بالنسبة لمنهجية البحث فهي نوعية متمثلة بتحليل أمثلة مأخوذة من مصادر متنوعة، عن طريق تطبيق مدخل انتقائي مبني على النموذجين أعلاه، ومن هنا تحاول الدراسة الإجابة على السؤال التالي: ما هو العنصر الأساس الذي يجعل الأجوبة البارة تسكت المخاطب؟ وتبين الإجابة بأنها المجانسة المبنية على الإشارة إلى ذات الآخر، إذ توظف على مستويين وقتي وشخصي، وتوصلت الدراسة إلى أن التركيب العملي للأجوبة البارة يشتمل على مكونين: ثابت ومتغير، إذ يعتمد الأخير على السياق بأوسع معانيه.

الكلمات المفتاحية: المجانسة، التركيب، التداولية السببية، الجواب البارع، الإسكات.

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